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RIGHTS FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS:
A GUARDIANSHIP MODEL FOR DOGS AND CATS
Throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to
some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable. We are
inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless "things" to be a
decree of Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of some
status quo.1
INTRODUCTION
The idea that nonhuman animals should have rights is amusing
to many people.2  Those humans who support the extension of
rights to nonhumans are frequently branded "sentimental,"3 a label
which has significantly impeded serious discussion 4 of our attitudes
toward nonhumans.
Nevertheless, those in the growing movement for animal libera-
tion5 are quite serious. They see the oppression and suffering of
millions of nonhumans, 6 readily visible to us all, and are demanding
1. C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TovwAnD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
NATURAL OBJECTS 6 (1974). This book appeared in its entirety in 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 450, 453 (1972).
2. C. STONE, supra note 1, at 8.
3. A. SCHWEiTzER, REVERENCE FOR LIFE 5 (1965); P. SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION ix (1975) [hereinafter cited as SINGER]; Brophy, In Pursuit of a
Fantasy, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 130 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, &
J. Harris eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brophy]; Regan, The Moral Basis
of Vegetarianism, 5 CAN. J. PHILO. 181, 182 (1975).
4. SINGER, supra note 3, at ix.
5. The leading text in the Animal Rights Movement is P. SINGER, ANI-
MAL LIBERATION (1975). See ANIMALS?- MEN AND MORALS (R. Godlovitch,
S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972); Fallows, Lo, The Poor Animals!
What Did Noah Save Them For?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at
58; Note, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL AFF. 205 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Rights for Animals].
6. Almost every facet of human activity has some adverse effect on non-
humans. For example, the cosmetics worn by humans are exhaustively
tested on nonhumans. Rabbits are widely used to test cosmetics for possi-
ble eye damage. The rabbits are placed in boxes with only their heads
protruding; their eyes are held open with metal clips, and concentrated
solutions of the experimental substance are dripped into their eyes. In
some tests, applications are repeated over several days to measure the dam-
age done. Damage may include severe pain, injury to the eye, or total
blindness. See SINGER, supra note 3, at 50-51.
The eating habits of most humans directly conflict with nonhumans' in-
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that humans begin to reevaluate their treatment of other species.'
The idea that many species of nonhumans 8 should have legal
rights has rarely been posited. Under our laws domesticated ani-
mals, in particular, have traditionally been viewed as property.'0
terest in both the existence and the enjoyment of life. A little known fact
about the meat industry is the manner in which nonhumans exist before
their deaths. Peter Singer writes extensively about factory farming, the big
business of mass-producing animals and raising them in close and often
highly oppressive confinement in order to get the highest yield for the least
amount of output. SINGER, supra note 3, at 96-170. See also Fallows, Lo,
The Poor Animals! What Did Noah Save Them For?, Tim ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at 61-62.
Many humans aspire to own fur coats. To make such a coat, trappers
use a device called a steel-jaw trap. When a nonhuman steps on this trap,
the metal teeth snap shut, shattering bones, and causing hours and some-
times days of agony. Because trappers do not check their traps daily, the
nonhumans either starve, bleed, or freeze to death. Nonhumans have been
known to chew off their own arms or legs in order to escape. The Fund
For Animals, in New York City, distributes leaflets with graphic examples
of nonhumans caught in the device.
Humans indulge in the erroneous belief that most research performed on
nonhumans is for some essential medical purpose. In fact, the overwhelm-
ing majority of experiments does not contribute to important medical re-
search. SINGER, supra note 3, at 33. Because nonhumans are easily ob-
tained, Ph.D. candidates and high school biology students often perform
repetitious and painful experiments. In 1973, the United States Government
paid experimenters to run dogs on a treadmill until their temperature
reached 113 and they died. The purpose was to show that heatstroke vic-
tims should be cooled. This experiment was performed even though the
same experiment has produced the same result many times before. As
early as 1881, experimenters electric-shocked dogs to a temperature of 113
and death to show that overheated bodies should be cooled. Fallows, Lo,
The Poor Animals! What Did Noah Save Them For?, THa ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at 63. This example is not exceptional. Experiments
are routinely performed on nonhumans, inflicting severe pain, and death,
with no practical benefit being derived. See generally SINGER, supra note
3, at 28-91.
7. See ANIMALS, MEN AND MoRALs (R. GODLOVITCH, S. GODLOVITCH & J.
HARRIS eds. 1972); SINGER, supra note 3; Legal Rights for Animals, supra
note 5.
8. In a literal sense, the term nonhuman encompasses all species except
humans. It is not suggested, however, that all nonhumans must enjoy legal
rights. The practical problems inherent in according rights to insects, for
example, would probably be too overwhelming for jour legal system to re-
solve. A means must be found to identify the species which should enjoy
legal rights. Although this Comment is not designed to enumerate precisely
which species should enjoy legal rights and which should not, factors useful
in locating the boundaries of legal rights are considered below.
9. The proposition was recently stated in Legal Rights for Animals, su-
pra note 5, at 205.
10. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 77 (West Supp. 1976).
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They are typically considered only in terms of their usefulness to
humans," rather than for their intrinsic worth as independent,
sentient beings.1 2  Although nonhumans contribute to human
well-being in countless ways, their property status affords them in-
sufficient protection and no legal rights.'3
This Comment describes the existing legal status of nonhumans
in general. Through an examination of the traditional cut-off
points for legal rights, it will be shown that nonhumans should have
rights that transcend their utility to humans.' 4 Finally, the Com-
ment presents a guardianship model as a possible way in which the
substantive rights of two species, dogs and cats, can be imple-
mented.' 5
THE EXISTING STATUS OF NONHUMANS
History demonstrates that as humans find new ways to use non-
11. S. Godlovitch, Utilities, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 177-78 (R.
Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch & J. Harris eds. 1972).
12. Courts have held that a dog's value "may be the market value or
some special or peculiar value to its owner to be ascertained by reference
to its usefulness or other qualities." Roos v. Loeser, 41 Cal. App. 782, 785,
183 P. 204, 205 (1919). See Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 676, 147 P. 1180
(1915); In re Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 P. 429 (1907); Jenkins v. Ballan-
tyne, 8 Utah 245, 30 P. 760 (1892).
13. See Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 228.
14. See SINGER, supra note 3, at viii; S. Godlovitch, Utilities, in ANIMALS,
MNIE AN MORALS 177-78 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds.
1972); Salt, The Rights of Animals, 10 INT'L J. ETHIcs 206, 210 (1900); Legal
Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 228. The assumption that nonhumans
should be given more adequate consideration is also implied by R. NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 35 (1974); C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE
STANDING? 50 (1974), also printed in 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 474 (1972).
Stone's essay calls for a recognition of rights for environmental objects in
nature.
15. Cats and dogs were chosen for practical reasons. They have a close
association with humans and are familiar to most readers. Implementing
legal rights for every species would be a monumental task. Each species
is distinct, with different needs and lifestyles, and the law would have to
reflect these differences. In addition, adopting a guardianship model for all
species would call for massive changes in the present societal order. For
example, if nonhumans were given the right to life, industries dependent
on nonhumans or nonhuman products would be affected in ways which
would reflect the scope of that right.
In 1972, total market sales for all livestock and their products was $34,-
317,000,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 597 (1973). The meat industry is the largest sector of the food in-
dustry. N. ALTMAN, EATING FOR LIFE 63 (1973). Thus, recognizing legal
rights for all sentient beings would require radical alteration of the present
national economy, diet, and lifestyle. As a practical matter, fashioning a
model limited to dogs and cats is more feasible. Nonetheless, it is hoped
that the principles discussed here will eventually be used to grant rights
to all nonhumans.
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humans, the relationship between the two grows closer.16 The le-
gal treatment of dogs and cats will serve to represent the treatment
of nonhumans as a whole. The domestication of dogs and cats is
illustrative. Dogs were probably first domesticated in Europe dur-
ing the Mesolithic period.17 Although no written record exists, re-
searchers believe that humans and semi-wild dogs developed a
hunting partnership in which the dog would pursue the animal and
the human would kill it.18 This arrangement was advantageous
to both species, for the percentage of kills effected was much higher
than that for either species working alone.'19 Those dogs who dis-
played better hunting skills probably got more food and a place
closer to the fire.20 A dependence on humans followed as the hu-
man settlements became a primary food source for the dogs.21
Similarly, cats are believed to have been domesticated as a result
of their pursuit of rodents inhabiting the graneries of early agricul-
turalists. 22 In order to protect their food supply, farmers encour-
aged the cats to stay.2 3
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone set the common law stand-
ard by characterizing cats and dogs as creatures "only kept for
pleasure, curiosity, or whim."24  Their value was not intrinsic;
rather, it depended "on the caprice of the owner.125 Unlike the cow
16. See Roos v. Loeser, 41 Cal. App. 782, 784, 183 P. 204, 205 (1919). See
also Downs, Domestication: An Examination of the Changing Social Rela-
tionships Betweeen Man and Animals, 22 KIosER Armo. Soc'Y PAPERS 18,
45 (1960).
17. The Mesolithic Age lasted from approximately 8,300 to 2,500 B.C.
Mesolithic or Middle Stone Age denotes the period between the Paleolithic
Age, when the great ice sheets began to recede, and the Neolithic Age. Dur-
ing the Mesolithic period, humans were still primarily food gatherers, rather
than food producers. J. CLARx, THE MESOLrHIc SETTLEMENT OF NORTHERN
EUROPE, A STUDY OF THE FOoD-GATHERING PEOPLES OF NORTHERN EUROPE
DURING THE EARLY PosT-GLAcIAL PERIOD Xiv (1953). Commentators pin-
point this period as the beginning of the domestication of dogs. See Downs,
Domestication: An Examination of the Changing Social Relationships Be-
tween Man and Animals, 22 KROEBER ANTHEO. Soc'y PAPERS 18, 45 (1960).
See also S. COLE, THE NEoLrrHc REVOLuTION 21 (1967).
18. Downs, Domestication: An Examination of the Changing Social
Relationships Between Man and Animals, 22 KROEBER A=BRo. Soc'Y
PAPERS 18, 46 (1960).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 58.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. II W. BLACKSTONE, CommENTARImS 1241 (W.C. Jones ed. 1916).
25. Id. at 1241.
or goat, the cat and dog did not serve as food or perform many prac-
tical functions beyond those already described. Thus, property in
dogs was of an "imperfect or qualified nature,"26 and accordingly
they received less legal protection than did the more useful nonhu-
mans.
27
The common law, shaped by the attitude that dogs and cats serve
only limited functions in society, correspondingly limited their legal
status and protections. 28 Dogs and cats were subjected to various
regulations not imposed on other domestic animals. 29 The state
could, and still does, compel owners to obtain a yearly license for
dogs,30 regulate the number of animals in a single residence,31 and
impound strays either to be destroyed or surrendered to institutions
for research.32 However, dogs and cats could not be the subject
of larceny, for at common law the punishment for larceny was
death, and it was considered unreasonable that a human should die
for stealing a dog or cat.33
26. Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans
& Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897); Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App.
676, 679, 147 P. 1180, 1181 (1915).
27. Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans
& Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897); Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App.
676, 679, 147 P. 1180, 1181 (1915).
28. II W. BLACKSTONE, COMMNnTARIES 1241 (W. Jones ed. 1916).
29. Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans
& Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 702 (1897).
30. Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920); Romero v. Santa Clara,
3 Cal. App. 3d 700, 83 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1970); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo.
442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957); Shadoan v. Barnett, 217 Ky. 205, 289 S.W. 204(1926). See generally CAL. FOOD & AGcic. CODE § 30501 (West 1968); MASS.
GEN. LAWS Amw. ch. 140, § 137 (West 1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
287.266 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Aauc. & MKTS. LAW § 109 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
31. E.g., a city statute may declare it unlawful to keep more than three
dogs in a home. See Miller v. Arcadia, 121 Cal. App. 660, 661, 9 P.2d 587,
587 (1932).
32. Simpson v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 271, 279, 253 P.2d 464, 469, appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953). See also Sentell v. New Orleans & Carroll-
ton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897); Shadoan v. Barnett, 217 Ky. 205, 289 S.W.
204 (1926); Massachusetts SPCA v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 339
Mass. 216, 158 N.E.2d 487 (1959); Central Westchester Humane Soc'y v. Hill-
eboe, 202 Misc. 881, 116 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1952); Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah
245, 30 P. 760 (1892); University of Wis. v. Dane County Humane Soc'y,
260 Wis. 486, 51 N.W.2d 56 (1952). See generally CAL. FOOD & AcRXC. CODE
§ 31106 (West 1968); MASS. Gnxu. LAWS A!wx. ch. 140, § 151A (West Supp.
1976); N.Y. AGRic. & MKis. LAW § 114 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
33. Suits for civil remedies were considered adequate. Sabin v. Smith,
26 CaL App. 676, 679, 147 P. 1180, 1181 (1915). Today, this treatment of
dogs and cats is not consistent throughout the United States. In defining
larceny, the Massachusetts legislature stated that the term property includes
"any domesticated animal, other than a dog, or a beast or bird which is
ordinarily kept in confinement and is not the subject of larceny at common
law." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(2) (West 1976). In Michigan,
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Today, society's dependence on cats and dogs has increased enor-
mously. Pets serve humans in a variety of ways, including child
substitute, companion,3 4 playmate, and protector of the home.35
Dogs have been used by psychiatrists as a means of establishing a
link with severely withdrawn children in order to bring them within
the therapist's reach.36  Each year throughout the United States
large numbers of dogs and cats are used in scientific and commercial
experimentation..3 7 They offer revenue to the growing pet food and
grooming industries built around* them38 and serve as a prime
source of entertainment in pet shows, dog races, zoos, circuses, tele-
vision, and films.3 9 Dogfighting, though illegal,40 is a thriving
business.
41
stealing a licensed dog is a misdemeanor, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 287.286
(b) (1976); but theft of livestock (horses, cows, sheep, etc.) is labeled lar-
ceny and is a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.357 (a) (1976). How-
ever, in New York, the unauthorized possession of a dog for more than ten
days is larceny. N.Y. AGPic. & MKTs. LAW § 363 (McKinney 1972).
34. Levinson, Psychology of Pet Ownership, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ECOLOGY OF THE SURPLUS DOG AND CAT PROBLEM
18 (1974).
35. RooS v. Loeser, 41 Cal. App. 782, 784, 183 P. 204, 205 (1919).
36. M. Fox, BEHAVIOUR OF WOLVES, DOGS, AND RELATED CANIDS 206 (1971);
Levinson, Psychology of Pet Ownership, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON THE ECOLOGY OF THE SURPLus DOG AND CAT PROBLEM 18 (1974).
37. Singer states that no one really knows the accuracy of the estimates,
for no full-scale survey has been done. SINGER, supra note 3, at 32. In
1966, the Animal Breeders Association estimated that between 500,000 and
1,000,000 dogs and cats had been used in research during the preceding year.
Id. In 1971, the Rutgers University College of Agriculture and Environ-
mental Sciences estimated that each year United States laboratories use
500,000 dogs and 200,000 cats. Dogs and cats comprise only a small propor-
tion of the estimated 63 million nonhumans used for research each year.
Id. at 32-33.
38. The Pet Food Institute, a national trade association of dog and cat
food manufacturers, sponsors a consumer education program throughout the
country. Pope, Public Education, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON THE SURPLUS DOG AND CAT PROBLEM 103 (1974).
39. For an interview with the feline star of Harry and Tonto, see ALL-
CATS MAGAZINE, July 1975, at 14.
40. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597.5 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 94-95 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.49 (1976); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw §§ 351-352 (McKinney 1975).
41. An example was provided by Deputy Andrew Garcia, vice squad,
Sheriff's Department in Los Angeles, California. During 1975, Deputy Gar-
cia was involved in a five-month undercover investigation of a dog-fighting
ring. In spring 1975, the investigation resulted in the arrest of 25 people
and the confiscation of 101 dogs. Of the 23 people convicted, none went
to prison, and the maximum fine imposed was $250. Several of the dogs
had to be destroyed; 12 were returned to their owners. The vice squad has
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The qualified property status advocated by Blackstone afforded
owners of these versatile animals inadequate protection.42 There-
fore the courts have since declared cats and dogs to be property, of
which an owner may not be deprived without due process of law. 48
Theoretically, protection is provided for dogs, cats, and other non-
humans by humane statutes and anti-cruelty laws. 44 Advocates of
rights for nonhumans have argued that, in truth, the statutes are
"to preserve the moral standards of human beings rather than to
prevent the abuse of other living creatures. '45
That these laws were ever meant to protect the interests of non-
humans is highly questionable.46 For example, under California
law, cruelly killing or injuring a nonhuman animal is a felony if
the animal belongs to another person.47 However, the same act
constitutes a mere misdemeanor when the killer is the animal's
owner.48 The explanation for the disparity in penalties is that
nonhumans are valued not as independent entities, but rather as ob-
jects to serve human desires.49 The law is concerned with depriva-
tion of property, not with the harm done to the nonhuman."°
Thus, when a nonhuman is stolen or killed by a third party, her
owner has a civil action for the value of the nonhuman."i How-
information that these people have resumed dog-fighting events, which can
earn the owner from $300 to $500 each fight. Telephone interview with
Deputy Andrew Garcia, Sheriffs Dep't, Los Angeles, Ca. (April 1976).
42. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897);
Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 676, 147 P. 1180 (1915). These cases are illus-
trative of the inadequacy of the qualified property status.
43. Fucelli v. ASPCA, 23 N.Y.S.2d 983, 984 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940). See also
Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah 245, 30 P. 760 (1892).
"Dogs are personal property, and their value is ascertained in the same
manner as other property." CAL. PENAL CODE § 491 (West 1976).
44. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597-597.2 (West Supp. 1976) defines forms
of cruelty and the penalties and duties imposed on owners and humane offi-
cers. See Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 220-25.
45. COMMITTEE FOR HUMANE LEGISLATION, INC., MODEL STATE ANIMAL PnO-
TECTION STATUTES (undated). The Committee, based in Washington, D.C.,is composed of private citizens, lawyers, and lobbyists working to obtain
more realistic protection for nonhumans. One of their proposals is estab-lishing a State Department of Animal Protection. See Nelson, Duties to An-
imals, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 149 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, &J. Harris eds. 1972); Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 228.
46. See Nelson supra note 45, at 149; Legal Rights for Animals, supra
note 5, at 228.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (a) (West Supp. 1976).
48. Id. § 597(b).
49. S. Godlovitch, Utilities, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MO ALS 177 (R. Godlo-
vitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
50. See, e.g., Roos v. Loeser, 41 Cal. App. 782, 183 P. 204 (1919). Seegenerally MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 85A (West 1970); MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 287.287 (1967).
51. See, e.g., Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 676, 679, 147 P. 1180, 1181
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ever, claims that nonhumans should possess rights of their own are
ridiculed through sarcasm or attempts at humor. 52
Neither the case law nor the present humane statutes and anti-
cruelty laws operate to assure nonhumans the rights they need and
deserve. As one commentator notes: "Real protection in our legal
system ... involves more than protection as mere property. It in-
volves the right to be heard, the right to be treated as having a
unique worth." 53
WHY NONHUMANS SHOULD HAVE LEGAL RIGHTS
Probably the chief obstacle to recognizing legal rights for nonhu-
mans has been the difficulty of delineating logical boundaries. This
difficulty consists of two components: that of identifying which
species should enjoy legal rights and that of identifying what those
rights should be.
Identifying the Species: The Inadequacies of Present Criteria for
Holders of Rights
Presently, humans are the only species possessing comprehensive
legal rights. This sharp dichotomy between humans and nonhu-
mans is based on justifications that are arbitrary and unsound.54
That nonhumans should qualify as holders of rights does not imply
that they should possess every right applicable to humans.55 How-
ever, under contemporary standards nonhumans are denied practi-
cally all rights.5 6 The following discussion examines the validity
(1915); II, W. BLAcKsToNF CowmNT ARIEs 1241 (W.C. Jones ed. 1916).
52. One judge noted: "It may be that 'every dog has his day'; but if
so, it is only a 'dog day' and does not entitle him to claim the rights of
persons." People v. Fimbres, 107 Cal. App. 778, 781, 288 P. 19, 20 (1930).
Another judge, casually dismissing a claim that dogs have rights, said: "In
these observations, though rather dog-matically asserted, we think no one
of ordinary experience in the common, all-around affairs of this mundane
sphere will hesitate to con-cur." In re Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 13, 91 P:
429, 433 (1907) (emphasis by court).
53. Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 228.
54. One author declared that because humans possess the right to life,
nonhumans should have the same right, for in both cases the right rests
on the same facts-"namely being alive" and sentient. Brophy, In Pursuit
of a Fantasy, in ANImALS, MEN AND MORALS 126 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlo-
vitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
55. Stone makes this point about the logical limit of rights to be given
the natural environment. C. STONE, supra note 1, at 10.
56. SINGER, supra note 3, at ix.
of various arguments which have been advanced to justify the de-
nial of rights to nonhumans.
One argument often made is that the inferior intelligence of non-
humans justifies depriving them of all legal rights.5 7 There are
several defects in this theory. First, the legal rights of a species
should not be determined exclusively by its average intelligence. 8
Although the average human intelligence exceeds that of the aver-
age nonhuman, there are humans who function on levels lower
than that of some cats or dogs. 59 Certainly cats and dogs "have
a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity for mean-
ingful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or some-
one in a state of advanced senility."00
Second, the type of intelligence possessed by many species is quite
similar to that present in humans.61 The early belief that animals
do not reason6 2 is now widely rejected.63  Dr. Wesley Mills ex-
pressed what has become the prevailing view: "[E] vidence of rea-
soning power is overwhelming for the upper ranks of animals, and
yearly the downward limits are being extended the more the infe-
rior tribes are studied."64 The difference in intelligence between
humans and nonhumans is one of degree rather than of kind, 5 a
fact clearly supported by modern scientific knowledge.6
57. "We have to ask whether we would consent to be used as mere means
by another being far superior to us in strength and intelligence." Nelson,
Duties to Animals, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 152 (R. Godlovitch, S.
Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
58. SINGER, supra note 3, at 4-5.
59. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 311 (1907).
60. SINGER, supra note 3, at 22.
61. C. DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN 193 (1871); Salt, The Rights of Animals,
10 INT'L J. ETHICS 206, 207 (1900).
62. Descartes considered that nonhumans are machines, having no ability
to reason and therefore no capacity to feel pain. R. DESCARTES, DISCOURSE
ON METHOD 46-48 (P. Olscamp trans. 1965).
63. "Formerly, the line was drawn at reason. It was said that the brutes
cannot reason. Only persons who do not themselves reason about the sub-ject, with the facts before them, can any longer occupy such a position."
Salt, The Rights of Animals, 10 INT'L J. ETHICS 206, 209 (1900), quoting Dr.
Wesley Mills. Salt noted that the word brute, which connotes irrational,
is a misnomer when applied to the more intelligent species. See R. LEWIN-
SOHN, ANIMALS, MEN AND MYTHS 193 (1954); L. ROSENFIELD, FROM BEAST-
MACHINE TO MAN-MACHINE 8 (1941); SINGER, supra note 3, at 218-20; Regan,
The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, 5 CAN. J. PHILO. 180, 184 (1975); Legal
Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 207.
64. Salt, The Rights of Animals, 10 INT'L J. ETHICS 206, 209 (1900).
65. Id. at 207; L. ROSENFIELD, FROM BEAST-MACHINE TO MAN-MACHINE 132
(1041).
66. E. THORND IE, ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE, EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 284-85
(1911).
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Even if all humans were more intelligent than all nonhumans,
and even if the differences were ones of kind rather than of degree,
a more fundamental problem with the intelligence theory exists:
Intelligence should not be determinative of legal rights.67 The
American system of law and government has always implicitly rec-
ognized that legal rights should not depend on inherent inequalities
among people. There is a great variety of human characteristics.
Certain humans are more intelligent than others; certain lives are
more fulfilling than others; certain lives are more valuable to soci-
ety than others. Nevertheless, the American legal system has al-
ways recognized that the law must treat people equally. 8
Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, And Utopia, offers an analogy
in which earth is visited by extraterrestial beings who have devel-
oped fourteen stages past the present development of earth's hu-
mans.0 9 Consistency with the present treatment of nonhumans
would compel the conclusion that humans could be sacrificed for
the benefit and comfort of these beings.70 If, however, it is unjus-
tifiable for beings to exploit other beings because of differences in
intelligence, our legal and moral treatment of nonhumans must be
reappraised.
Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. There is no logi-
cally compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in
ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount
of consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle
of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged
actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we
should treat humans.71
A second argument often raised to defend the rightlessness of
nonhumans is that they do not possess the human form.72 One
author 73 has imagined the development of a chemical which, if in-
jected into the brain of a kitten, would cause its mind to develop
similarly to that of a human. If, at maturity, this being has the
67. Brophy, In Pursuit of a Fantasy, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 129(R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972). See THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE (1776).
68. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal. . . ." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776).
69. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 46 (1974).
70. Id. at 46; Nelson, Duties To Animals, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS
152 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
71. SINGER, supra note 3, at 5.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHILo. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972).
physical form of a cat and the intellectual capacity of a human,
would treating her as mere property be morally or legally justifia-
ble?74 Could it be said that she has no right to life?
That physical form should not determine the existence of rights
can be illustrated in another way. If a human has some gross de-
formity, would killing her be permissible because of her dissimilar-
ity to the human form? Obviously, the answer is in the negative,
and thus the physical form argument collapses.
Another justification for denying rights to nonhumans is rooted
in the concept of spirituality. A widely held belief is that nonhu-
mans do not possess souls and that this difference justifies disparate
treatment.7 5 Because the concept of soul is so nebulous, this argu-
ment is difficult to address. While Western religious theorists have
stated that only humans have souls, certain religions, notably Jain-
ism and Hinduism, ascribe souls to all beings and objects.7 ' The
question arises about which belief, if either, is correct. Further, in
order to understand whether soul is present in humans but not in
nonhumans, it is necessary to define precisely what soul is.7 7 Last-
ly, even if all these questions were answerable, a problem similar
to that engendered by the intelligence theory would arise: Why is
the presence or absence of soul a basis for determining legal
rights?78
A final justification for ignoring the rights of nonhumans has
been a belief that nonhumans are unable to communicate. This
attitude has not been directed solely at nonhumans. One writer
noted that "[t] he common practice of disregarding the interests of
barbarians has been justified on the very grounds that communica-
tion with them was impossible.""7
The fact that nonhumans do communicate is more significant
74. Id. at 60.
75. SINGER, supra note 3, at 21 n.*.
76. M. STEINBERG, BASIC JUDAISM 160-61 (1947). "The human soul first
came about at the critical point of evolution when a primate became able
to reflect on himself-and hence became human, a man, free and immor-
tal . . . ." A. WILHELM, CMUsT AMONG Us 24 (1973). The belief that all
matter possesses souls was emphasized by the Jains and has had considerable
influence on Indian thinking in general. A. EMBREE, THE HINDU TRADITION
71 (1966).
77. SINGER, supra note 3, at 21 n.*. See also R. COPLESTON BUDDHISM
(1892); M. FAKmHY, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (1970); B. RAY, ArmP-
CAN RELIGIONS (1976). Each of these authors discusses soul, but none de-
fines it.
78. SINGER, supra note 3, at 21 n.*.
79. Peters, Nature and Culture, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 219 (R.
Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
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than the form such communication takes.80 Communication is ef-
fected through a whole complex of visual, auditory, tactile, and ol-
factory signals.8 ' For example, in dogs, wolves, and otler canids,
the tail is used as a visual signal. An erect tail indicates arousal;
a lowered tail may be a sign of submission; a wagging tail is a sign
of happiness and greeting.8 2 Dogs also use urination and defeca-
tion to communicate certain facts to others. The scent itself indi-
cates which dog had been nearby, and freshness indicates how often
and when that dog had been in the area.8 3 Barking may signify
a need for attention or the presence of a territorial rival; barking,
growling, whining, and yelping are all vocalizations used to express
distress.8 4
Jane Goodall, in her studies of chimpanzees, found that three
sounds in particular are functional in coordinating the mother-
infant relationship: "the 'hoo' whimper, the scream,. and the 'soft
bark.' ,85 These sounds are combined with various facial and pos-
tural signals. Thus, an infant separated from her mother and seek-
ing to reestablish physical contact would make a "pout-face" in con-
junction with a "hoo" whimper.8 6
As a third example, scientists have begun to study the sounds
made by whales. Sounds of baleen whales are generally low fre-
quency; the highest sound is that of the humpback whale.8 7 Hump-
backs are one of the few whale species whose sounds have been re-
corded.8 8 While there is no authenticated case of vocal communi-
cation among whales, or between humans and whales,89 scientists
80. T. SEBEOK & A. RAMSAY, APPROACHES TO ANIMAL COMMUNICATION 73
(1969).
81. S. ALTMANN, SOCIAL COMMUNICATION AMONG PRIMATES 330 (1967).
Altmann notes that humans, like nonhumans, frequently rely on "nonlin-
guistic cues." Id. at 328. See also T. SEBEOK & A. RAMSAY, APPROACHES
TO ANIMAL COMMUNICATION 181 (1969).
82. M. Fox, BEHAVIOUR OF WOLvEs, DOGS AND RELATED CAN Ds 194 (1971).
83. Id. at 189.
84. Id. at 185. See H. FINK, MIND AND PERFORmANCE 35 (1954).
85. van Lawick-Goodall, Mother-Offspring Relationships in Free-ranging
Chimpanzees, in PRIMATE ETHOLOGY 331 (D. Morris ed. 1967).
86. Id. at 332.
87. Interview with Dr. William Cummings, Naval Undersea Center, in
San Diego, Ca. (Nov. 1976).
88. Hill, Vanishing Giants, 77 AUDUBON 56, 76 (1975).
89. Dr. Cummings stressed that studies done to date do not present con-
clusive evidence of communication, but because of whales' large variety of
sounds and their propensity for sound, we can judge that communication
is occurring. Interview with Dr. Cummings, supra note 87.
continue to study whales, believing that such communication oc-
curs.90 For instance, scientists have succeeded in using sounds of
the killer whale, a fierce predator, to intimidate other whales.91 In
playing the sounds of the killer to migrating California gray whales,
researchers find that the gray whales head in the opposite direction
to avoid the source of the sound. Similar experiments have shown
that when the sound of killer whales is played to other whales,
avoidance tactics occur.9 2 Some species make signals which mem-
bers of other species are able to understand.9 3 The ways in which
nonhumans convey fear or other emotions to humans are similar to
the ways in which humans convey such emotions to one another.9 4
This fact is a reminder that nonhumans do experience emotions and
that these emotions are often expressed in ways not so different
from our own.
Descriptions of nonhuman communicatory systems are endless: It
is hoped the preceding examples will suffice to show the subtle and
complex patterns employed to communicate both verbal and non-
verbal messages. As humans study and learn to understand nonhu-
man communicatory forms, this justification for rightlessness makes
progressively less sense.
The failure of three of the above justifications-intelligence,
physical form, and language-was noted by Jeremy Bentham, who
wrote:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may
acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from
them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already dis-
covered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human
being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number
of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os
sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive
being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the in-
superable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty
of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison
a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they
were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?95
90. See note 87 supra. See also Hill, supra note 88.
91. See note 87 supra.
92. Id. Dr. Cummings has noted this behavior in all experiments.
93. Peters, Nature and Culture, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 219 (R.
Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
94. Id. at 220.
95. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 311 (1907).
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Identifying the Species: The Formation of More Rational Stand-
ards
If the criteria of intelligence, physical form, spirituality, and abil:
ity to communicate are logically irrelevant to the determination of
whether an organism should have legal rights, the question arises
of what the criteria should be. Several noted philosophers have ad-
vanced ideas applicable in this context.
Jeremy Bentham offered a rational and compassionate criterion-
'the ability to feel pain.9 6 No reason exists to think that humans
are more sensitive to physical pain than are higher forms of non-
human life.9 7 The nervous systems of all vertebrates are simi-
lar.0 8 In the higher vertebrates, the center for all sensory input
is the thalmus, a portion of the diencephalon lying in the forebrain.
Scientists rely on this similarity for the many experiments they per-
form on nonhumans in order to benefit humans.99
Furthermore, while nonhumans cannot verbalize their pain, they
can show it in a fashion quite similar to that of humans-facial con-
tortions, body movements, screams and moaning noises, and "at-
tempts to avoid the source of the pain [and] the appearance of fear
at the prospect of its repetition."'0 0
Some may argue that a human suffers more because of a better
memory of pain and the ability to anticipate. 1 1 However, the op-
posite can occur. If a human was placed in a cage, she could amuse
herself by reading a book and could understand the reason for her
confinement. But a lioness, wild from birth, would be unable to
comprehend the reason for her imprisonment or the intentions of
her captors. Thus; her terror and anguish would be greater. 02
96. Id.
97. SINGER, supra note 3, at 17; Harris, Killing for Food, in ANIMALS, MEN
AND MORALS 103 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972); Salt,
The Rights of Animals, 10 INT'L J. ETHIcs 206, 230 (1900).
98. C. PROSSER, COMPARATIVE ANIMAL PHYSIOLOGY 666 (1973). See A.
ROMER, THE VERTEBRATE BODY 502 (1970); J. WILSON, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL
PHYSIOLOGY 427 (1972).
99. Although the human brain is more developed than that of other
species, the major difference is in the cerebral cortex, which controls the
thinking process. Feelings and impulses are controlled by the diencepha-
Ion, which is also well developed in other mammals and birds. M. GOR-
DON, ANIMAL FUNcTION: PRINCIPLES AND ADAPTATIONS 467 (1968).
100. SINGER, supra note 3, at 12. See Regan, The Moral Basis of Veg-
etarianism, 5 CAN. J. PHILo. 181, 186 (1975).
101. SINGER, supra note 3, at 18.
102. Id.; Brophy, In Pursuit of a Fantasy, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS
129 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
Because many nonhumans are capable of suffering 03 and be-
cause they reason, 0 4 these nonhumans have interests:105 It is
in their interest to avoid pain and suffering. 106
The ability to desire or to have interests is the criterion for rights
set forth by Michael Tooley in his discussion, Abortion and Infanti-
cide.10 7 Tooley begins by defining a person "as a purely moral
concept, free of all descriptive content."' 08 To have a serious right
to life, an organism, whether human or nonhuman, must be a "per-
son." Tooley examines whether either a fetus or a very young in-
fant could satisfy his definition of person.1 9 He argues that in or-
der to have a right to something, the individual must be able to de-
sire the thing:
[If] A is the sort of thing that is a subject of experiences and other
mental states, A is capable of desiring X, and if A does desire X,
then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from
actions that would deprive him of it.110
Tooley calls his cut-off point the achievement of "self-conscious-
ness.""'1 An organism is a "person," possessing a serious right to
life, when it is able to conceptualize about its own "self as a continu-
ing subject of experiences and other mental states"" 2 and has the ca-
pability of desiring to continue as such an entity. Present human
morality recognizes a right not to be tortured, but not a right to
life for nonhumans. Under Tooley's definition, most higher forms
would have a serious claim to the right of life.113
Darwin, in his revolutionary theory on the close relationship be-
tween humans and nonhumans, said:
We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions
and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, and curiosity, imita-
tion, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may well be found in an
incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the
lower animals.114
Although Darwin did not propose that these properties be used
as a basis for conferring legal rights, his statement does suggest an-
103. Brophy, In Pursuit of a Fantasy, in ANIMALS, MEN AND MORALS 129
(R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
104. See note 61 supra.
105. SINGER, supra note 3.
106. Id.
107. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PBILO. & PuB. AFF. 37 (1972).
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id. at 50-51.
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id. at 50.
112. Id. at 44.
113. Id. at 37.
114. C. DAR w N, DESCENT OF MAN 193 (1871).
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other approach. The weighing of all the characteristics Darwin
cites could arguably serve as a way of determining which species
should have rights. Again, the higher forms of nonhuman life read-
ily fit within the meaning of the above-quoted passage. Any one
of the above criteria-Bentham's pain theory, Tooley's desire the-
ory, or the collective approach following from Darwin-compels the
conclusion that nonhuman animals should be accorded legal rights.
Identifying the Rights
Once it is concluded that certain nonhuman animals should have
legal rights, the question arises about which rights they should
have. It is impossible to catalog with specificity the precise rights
which each species should enjoy. Presumably these rights will be
developed by the legislatures and judiciary in much the same man-
ner in which definitions of human rights have evolved.1 15 The gen-
eral principles which define these rights can be demonstrated by
analogizing to human legal rights. For example, because humans are
alive and sentient, the Declaration of Independence announced a
right to be alive and to follow the pleasure-pain principle." 6 "Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" 117 were found to be rights
possessed by humans. That nonhumans are alive and sentient
should logically imply that they too have a basic right to life and
freedom from unwarranted pain and suffering. 1
18
Rights should reflect the interests of the holder."19 Differences
between humans and nonhumans would generate different rights
for each. Concern for the well-being of a child may require that
the child be educated. Concern for the well-being of a pig would
require merely that the pig be left with other pigs in a place with
adequate food and space to roam freely.'120
115. Burr discusses the feasibility of several specific rights for nonhu-
mans. He considers giving nonhumans access to the courts through legal
guardians so that nonhumans could sue for their own injuries. Legal Rightsfor Animals, supra note 5, at 228. Also, nonhumans could be given the right
to enforce the present anti-cruelty statutes through equitable actions. Id.
at 229-30. Burr also advocates creating a new tort at common law, the tort
of inflicting pain on an animal. Id. at 230-31.
116. Brophy, In Pursuit of a Fantasy, in AmmALs, MEN AND MORALS 126
(R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris eds. 1972).
117. Id. at 127.
118. SINGER, supra note 3, at 21-24; Brophy, In Pursuit of a Fantasy, in
ANIMALs, MEN AND MORALS 128 (R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, & J. Harris
eds. 1972).
119. SiNGER, supra note 3, at 2-7.
120. Id. at 6.
But the basic element-the taking into account of the interests
of the being, whatever those interests may be-must, according to
the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white,
masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.121
Nothing contained in this Comment should be construed as a sug-
gestion that the legal rights of nonhumans must be absolute. Just
as some of the most basic human rights may be limited,122 so too
would the rights of nonhumans have certain boundaries. Subject
to reasonable restrictions, the rights of nonhumans should reflect
their interest in life and their corollary interests in food, care, and
maintenance. The crucial point, regardless of the specific right in-
volved, is that nonhumans are entitled to equal consideration based
on their individual characteristics; 123 they should be recognized as
holders of legal rights. 24
A GUARDIANSHIP MODEL FOR DOGS AND CATS
If nonhumans are to have certain rights, and if each species is to
have rights consistent with its interests, a system must be devised
which implements the rights of each species. Domesticated dogs
and cats are two species which meet the criteria for holders of legal
rights. 2 5  They are a higher form of life, having the ability to
feel and express their pain and pleasure, and the ability to reason
and to desire. In recognition of these abilities, the law should af-
ford them legal rights.
The existing statutes1 26 fail in this regard, for they are based
on the assumption that inflicting suffering on nonhumans tends to
corrupt humans. Their focus on human morality diverts the stat-
utes from what should be their true purpose-effective protection
of the nonhuman.
121. Id.
122. E.g., the right to life may be taken away upon the conviction of cer-
tain crimes. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2971 (1976). The state may, for
compelling reasons, limit an individual's freedom of expression. Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971).
123. See SINGER, supra note 3, at 6.
124. Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 227-29. Also, Stone lists
three criteria for a holder of legal rights which can be applied to nonhumans
as well as to the environment. "First, that the thing can institute legal ac-
tions at its behest; second, that in determining the granting of legal relief,
the court must take injury to it into account; and, third, that relief must
run to the benefit of it." C. STONE, supra note 1, at 11-12.
125. See note 15 supra.
126. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 597-99 (West 1970 & West Supp. 1976);
MAss. GEx. LAWs ANN. ch. 272, §§ 77-95 (West 1970 & West Supp. 1976);
McH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 750.49-.70 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. AGRIC. & MIKTs. LAW
§§ 353-376 (McKinney 1972).
[voL. 14: 484, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
This preoccupation with human interests is reinforced by the fact
that dogs and cats are considered property. When a nonhuman is
injured, recovery goes not to the nonhuman, but to her "owner."'127
Moreover, in many jurisdictions, if a nonhuman is injured or killed
by her owner, the punishment of that owner is significantly less
stringent than it would have been had a third party committed the
same act.128 Thus, it is the nonhuman's worth to a human, not
her individual worth, which determines the sanction. Lastly, be-
cause they are considered property, nonhumans may be used by the
state for medical research. 1 29  These nonhumans are outside the
general application of the anti-cruelty statutes. 30  Therefore, any
sort of atrocity may be and is performed on laboratory animals.' 3 '
Although the guardianship model would not preclude research for
important medical needs, it would at least assure that those needs
be balanced against the dog's or cat's interest in life.
A further shortcoming of the anti-cruelty statutes is that they are
designed neither to anticipate nor to prevent cruelty. 132 They are
activated only after the fact, when the dog or cat has already suf-
fered the damage.'3 3 This situation emphasizes that their focus is
on punishing the human rather than protecting the nonhuman.
13 4
As an alternative, this Comment proposes a legislative change of
status for dogs and cats, removing them from the property category,
and a guardianship model to implement their rights. Because anti-
127. See note 51 supra.
128. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1976). The Michigan
and Massachusetts statutes make no such distinction. The New York stat-
ute does not differentiate on the basis of ownership, but rather on the basis
of usefulness of a domestic animal. While cruelty to animals is generally
a misdemeanor (e.g., N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 1972)),
injury to or destruction of a domestic animal used for racing, breeding, or
competitive exhibition is a felony. E.g., N.Y. AGac. & MKTs. LAW § 361
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1650-73 (West 1970); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 49A, §§ 1-10 (West 1976); McH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 287.381-
.394 (1976); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 504-5 (McKinney 1971).
130. In New York, laboratory animals are specifically exempted by stat-
ute. N.Y. AGRIc. & MxTs. LAw § 353 (McKinney 1972). In California, un-
claimed, impounded dogs and cats may, under city ordinances, be sent to
both, public and private laboratories. There is no meaningful regulation of
the researchers to ensure humane treatment. Simpson v. Los Angeles, 40
Cal. 2d 271, 253 P.2d 464, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953).
131. SINGER, supra note 3, at 28-95.
132. Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 226.
133. See note 124 supra.
134. Legal Rights for Animals, supra note 5, at 226.
cruelty statutes remain the "real heart of animal protection in this
country,"' 3 5 they should be retained to supplement the recent pro-
posals made by advocates of rights for nonhumans.13 Each of
these proposals views the nonhuman as an independent holder of
rights.
The essence of guardianship is "care and compassion"' 3 and an
acceptance of responsibility for both the physical and mental well-
being of the ward. 38 The guardian is the protector of the ward,
who by reason of "weakness, incompetence, youthfulness, or other
legally recognized disability,"' 39 needs an intermediary to put her
on more equal footing with the rest of society.
The primary advantage of the guardianship model is that the ba-
sic principles are already well defined and have long been used
throughout the country as a means of protecting those Who are in-
capable of asserting their rights. Additionally, the change of status
from personal property to ward recognizes dogs and cats as holders
of legal rights and should prompt legislators to enact laws with
more stringent penalties for crimes committed against nonhumans.
Most important is the psychological impact on humans of recogniz-
ing the individual worth of other sentient beings.
At present, any natural person or nonprofit corporation may act
as a guardian.1 40  Under existing law, there are two types of
wards, minors and mental incompetents. 1 4 1 Considering dogs and
cats another type of ward is not difficult. The problem lies in de-
fining who the guardian should be and how the guardianship pro-
cedure should operate.
In the case of minors, the parent is defined as the natural guard-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 205; COMMITTEE FOR HUMANE LEGISLATION, INC., MODEL STATE
ANIMAL PROTECTION STATUTES (undated). "On Jan. 22, [1977] delegates of
animal protection associations from many countries will meet in Paris to
prepare the presentation of the charter entitled Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Animals to UNESCO." The Charter stresses that "vivisection
must neither mutilate nor cause pain" and bans "bull-fighting, safaris, hunt-
ing, pigeon-shooting, and cockfighting," condemning these activities as bio-
cide. The Minneapolis Star, Dec. 25, 1976, § A, at 4, cols. 1-3.
137. J. JEFFREY, THE GUARDIANS HANDBOOK (INCOMPETENT) 37 (1971).
138. Id.
139. R. MAcKEY, GUARDIANSHIP AND THE PROTECTION OF INFANTS 7 (1957).
See also R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
439 (1975).
140. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1400 (West Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1628
(1975); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1703 (McKinney 1967), § 1754 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976).
141. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1400 (West Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201, § 1 (West Supp. 1976); McH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1602 &
703.1 (1976); N.Y. Sum. CT. PRoc. ACT § 1701 (McKinney 1967), § 1750 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1976).
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ian of the child. 142 A parent who is unable to carry out his or
her duties may be replaced through the appointment of a general\ ,
guardian for the minor.143 Similarly, courts have power to ap-
point a guardian over someone who is found to be mentally incom-
petent.144
One approach to extending the guardianship model to dogs and
cats is to broaden the definition of natural guardian to include the
human who has elected to take responsibility for the care and well-
being of a nonhuman. This guardianship would commence when
the human manifested some intent to protect the nonhuman, either
through "adoption" from a pound or animal shelter or through
transfer from another human. Neither a formal adoption procedure
nor a court appointed guardian seems feasible, for most humans
would probably decline to go through the expense and effort in-
volved in those procedures in order to have a cat or dog live with
them.
Although the parent-offspring relationship does not exist, the hu-
man guardian could be viewed as a "natural guardian" of the non-
human in the sense that the human has evolved into the "natural"
companion and protector of cats and dogs in modern society.14 5 Al-
ternatively, the relationship between humans and nonhumans could
be considered a "quasi-guardianship."' 46 A quasi-guardian would
stand in much the same position as a court appointed guardian, rep-
resenting the ward in legal actions and caring for the basic necessi-
ties of the ward. 47
142. This idea is a product of case law. Stinson v. Meegan, 319 Mass.
682, 67 N.E.2d 465 (1946); Paton v. Paton, 363 Mich. 192, 108 N.W.2d 876
(1961). See R. MACKEY, GUARDIANSHIP AND THE PROTECTION OF INFANTS
14 (1957).
143. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1440 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201, § 2 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 703.2-.3
(1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1210 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
144. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 201, § 1 (West Supp. 1976); MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 330.1604
(1975); N.Y. Sumi. CT. PRoc. ACT § 1750 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
145. Some objection may be made to this expansion of the concept. Such
a change would probably have to be effected by statute, for courts have
condemned as careless any extension of the term guardian. H. TAYLOR, LAW
OF GUARDIAN AND WARD 32 (1935).
146. Id. In an early Missouri case, the court refused to recognize a natu-
ral guardianship in anyone other than the father or mother of a child. The
court employed the term quasi-guardian to describe the grandmother who
had cared for the minor and who had exercised control over the minor's
estate. Stetina v. Bergstein, 204 Mo. App. 366, 370, 221 S.W. 420, 421 (1920).
147. H. TAYLOR, LAW OF GUARDIAN AND WARD 69 (1935).
The guardian's general duties would apply to a guardian of the
dog or cat. These duties would include the obligation to provide
care and custody148 and the right to sue on behalf of the ward,140
with recovery going to the ward. Such a scheme would result in
the creation of property rights for dogs and cats. The court granting
recovery to the ward would be required to give the general guard-
ian or some other person or entity the responsibility of prudent
management of the funds for the ward's benefit."
The safeguards provided for minors and mental incompetents in
the guardianship system could be adapted to dogs and cats. In the
event that a guardian abused her ward or a third person injured the
ward and the guardian failed to act, a responsible animal protection
organization could be designated guardian ad litem by the court."'
148. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODs § 1500 (West Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
A.NN. ch. 201, § 5 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 703.7
(1976), § 703.8 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 82 (McKinney 1964);
N.Y. SuRmi CT. Paoc. ACT § 1751 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
149. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1501 (West Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201, § 37 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 703.18
(1968).
150. For examples of state statutes governing the duty of the guardian
to care for the property of the ward, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502 (West 1956);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 12 (West Supp. 1976); MIcH. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 703.17 (1968); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1723 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
At present, some states allow a wrongful death action. E.g., MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 85A (West 1970), under which, if the dog is killed,
maimed, or enticed or carried away, the owner has a tort action against
the wrongdoer for three times the value of the d6g. See also MIcH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 287.287 (1967). Standing should be extended to interested
animal rights organizations to sue for the wrongful death of individuals or
large groups of animals.
A problem will occur when, during the lifetime of the ward, the guardian
sues on behalf of the ward and recovers. Because the ward is the legal
holder of the property, the ward's death will require disposition of the prop-
erty. Cases will arise in which the guardian has given lifelong care and
support to the ward and thus will justly deserve this "inheritance." Never-
theless, giving the guardian an expectancy in the ward's property may en-
courage many untimely deaths of dogs and cats. Additionally, claims may
come from guardians of cats and dogs who are related to the decedent. The
problem of how to dispose of the property of the decedent is .difficult. The
best solution may be to provide for reversion to nonprofit organizations who
represent animals' rights.
151. California provides for guardians ad litem in CAL. CIV. CODE § 42
(West 1954); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 372 (West 1973); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1607
(West 1957). Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 1401 (West 1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 34 (West 1958); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 703.12
(1968), § 330.1616 (1975); N.Y. Civ. PRuc. R. 1202 (McKinney 1963); N.Y.
SuRR. CT. PRoc. ACT § 403 (McKinney Supp. 1976). Various organizations
exist that could represent the interests of nonhumans, including the United
Action for Animals, Fund for Animals, and Friends of Animals.
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This organization would sue on behalf of the injured dog or cat.152
The guardian could be removed by the court for failure to prop-
erly care for the ward. Absent such failure, the guardianship would
terminate either when the ward dies or when the guardian is inca-
pable or unwilling to continue in that capacity. 153 The guardian
would be permitted to transfer the guardianship to some other hu-
man.
The guardianship model is analogous to the ideas of Justice Doug-
las as expressed in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton. 54 In that case the Sierra Club, an organization devoted to
protecting the environment, sought to challenge federal approval of
a massive development project in Mineral King Valley, a scenic area
of California. The majority held that the organization itself, with-
out alleging injury to its members, lacked standing to sue. In a cre-
ative dissent, Justice Douglas argued that environmental objects
should themselves be accorded legal rights.155 Recognized envi-
ronmental organizations could then sue on behalf of the natural ob-
ject.
To support his position, Justice Douglas analogized to other areas
of the law in which inanimate objects are recognized as parties in
litigation.156 This legal fiction has been widely applied to ships
and to corporations in order to protect their interests. 157  It
should apply as well to valleys, rivers, and mountains endangered
by modern technology. In the same way, animal rights groups
should be allowed to represent the interests of dogs and cats when
the need arises, so that these beings will have the chance to be
heard.
The guardianship system offers a viable method of extending le-
gal rights to dogs and cats. It gives more effective protection than
the present anti-cruelty statutes. Although no law can succeed
completely in preventing the abuse which it makes illegal, the
152. Animal protection organizations could also represent classes of ani-
mals-e.g., those on farms, those in zoos, and members of endangered spe-
cies.
153. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 1590 (West Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201 §§ 13 & 33 (West Supp. 1976); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN.§ 330.1636 (1975); N.Y. SuRn. CT. PRoc. AcT § 1752 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
154. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
155. Id. at 752.
156. Id. at 742.
157. Id. at 742-43.
guardianship model would accomplish at least two things. First, it
would supply an additional deterrent to the abuse of dogs and cats,
for through their guardians, dogs and cats would be able to sue for
their own injuries. Thus a potential wrongdoer would be faced not
only with stiffer criminal penalties but also with civil liability, in-
cluding medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering. Sec-
ond, the guardianship model would have the psychological effect of
making humans understand that dogs and cats are members of soci-
ety who deserve and will receive real protection under the law.
CONCLUSION
Although the claim that nonhumans should have rights will seem
unlikely to some and absurd to others, philosophers, moralists, sci-
entists, and lawyers have begun to understand that the claim is
valid. By. engaging in "speciesism," 1 5 -a belief that all other
forms of life are secondary to their own-humans often fail to see
how the majority of nonhumans actually live-and die.
The guardianship model for dogs and cats serves as one alterna-
tive to the present system. Its purpose is twofold: to emphasize
the rights that nonhumans possess independently of human inter-
ests and to provide a means by which these rights can be protected.
Nonhuman animals should not be excluded from the equality of
treatment and consideration which our society provides for its other
members. Thus, it is time for some questions to be asked concern-
ing the rights of nonhuman animals. It is time for a drastic reeval-
uation of their present status in our legal system.
JOYCE S. TISCHLER
158. SINGEa, supra note 3, at 7.
